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For several decades following the Second World War, the term "multinational 
corporation" was virtually synonymous with overseas activity by U.S. firms. Not until the late 
1960s and early 1970s did most European and Japanese firms move really aggressively into 
foreign operations. Until quite recently, some writing referred to foreign investment in the 
United States as "reverse investment," thereby suggesting its novelty in the post-war period. 1 
Many writers use the terms "multinational corporation" and "foreign direct investment" 
(FDI)2 interchangeably because the latter term tries to identify foreign capital that plays an 
ownership role. As late as 1977, the share of foreign affiliate output in the gross product of the 
private American economy was 2.3 percent; by 1991, it had reached 5.9 percent, and it has not 
moved from that level by more than a tenth of a percentage point in the period since (Fahim-
Nader and Zeile, 1998: 39). Using another measure, total employment, the share of workers 
employed by foreign affiliates fell slightly but steadily over the 1990s, from 5.3 percent in 1991 
to 4.8 percent in 1996 (Fahim-Nader and Zeile, 1998: 51 ). 
Although FDI may expand in the future, the current level leaves the United States with a 
considerably lower level of foreign activity than any other major modem economy except Japan, 
where the estimated stock of direct investment divided by GDP was .3 percent in 1995 by 
comparison with 7.7 percent in the U.S. The EU (European Union) average was 12.2. 
(UNCTAD, 1997: 338-339). 
1 For a sketch of the often substantial role that incoming direct investment played prior to the late 1970s, see 
Glickman and Woodward, 1989, pp. 27-32. 
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MEASURING DIRECT INVESTMENT 
How is direct investment measured? Alternative approaches differ markedly from each 
other and paint different pictures of the role of direct investment in the United States. The most 
important current data on FDI comes from the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the Department 
of Commerce; BEA presents estimates of both the measured amount of direct investment in the 
United States and the volume and character of the total activity that foreigners control. 
Commerce's International Trade Administration (IT A) also published some annual data on FDI 
until 1995. 
Both BEA series are culled from mandatory reporting forms provided by U.S. firms, but 
they differ markedly in concept. The balance of payments data attempt to capture the net book 
value of foreigners' holdings and net outstanding loans to their U.S. affiliates along with year-to-
year changes in these measures. Investment is considered "direct", i.e. controlling, if 10 percent 
or more of a U.S. affiliate is owned by a single foreign entity. 
BEA also publishes a quite different set of FDI data concerning financial and operating 
measures-including gross capital stock and employment. By contrast with the first category, 
these measures are provided at both the national and the state level. Perhaps the most important 
distinction from the first set of measures lies in the fact that once the common 10 percent 
threshold of "ownership" is met, the entire controlled investment is counted as FDI, and 
expansion or contraction for the entire investment appears in the data. 
A simple example illustrates this major difference between investment figures in the two 
BEA data sets. Suppose a British firm owned 15 percent of a U.S. firm with total assets of $1 
2 Much writing on this subject uses the terms incoming direct investment (IFDI) to distinguish it from outgoing 
direct investment (OFDI). Because flows into the United States are the entire focus of this study, the simpler term 








million in 1996. It would be recorded as a direct investment in both data sets, but in one the 
foreign firm's stake will appear as $150,000 while in the other it will be recorded as $1 million. 
Just as important, if in 1997 the foreign firm increased its ownership to 25 percent while the total 
capital of the acquired firms stayed the same, the balance of payments data would show an 
increase in FDI of $100,000 while the other series would indicate no change. In sharp contrast, 
if, in the next year, either by expansion of domestic equity or debt, the assets of the acquired firm 
doubled, then the financial and operating data would show a doubling in FDI while the balance 
of payments data would show no change in all. 
Another distinction between the two data sets is essential for understanding the 
usefulness of data for the several states. If one is concerned with the impact of investment on 
state level activity, physical assets and employment in the state-and not all assets held by a 
foreign firm located in the state-are what count. 
The first four columns of Table 1 show alternative measures of foreign direct investment 
in the United States. Column 1 gives the investment position data derived from balance of 
payments accounts, while Column 2 provides an estimate of asset control. Not surprisingly, 2 is 
several times the size of 1, suggesting how foreign equity is leveraged into much greater asset 
control. The third and fourth ~olumns provide national estimates of measures that will be used at 
the state level in the discussion that follows this introduction. Column 3 differs from 2 by 
removing all investment not directly related to firm operations. The employment connected with 
those operations is presented in Column 4. It will be noted that the increase in 3 over time 
greatly exceeds the rise in 4 ( e.g. the ratio of 1996 to 1980 in 3 is 6.24, while in 4, the ratio is 
only 2.44). Part of this difference results from inflation and the failure of book value adequately 
to reflect the replacement value of the assets involved. 
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Table 1: Some Measures of Foreign Direct Investment in the United States 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
FDIUS Total Assets of Gross Book Value Employment Total Outlays on U.S. Outlays on . U.S. Outlays on Emplqy1.11ent of 
(billions US$) US Non-bank of Property, Plant (thousands) Newly Acquir~d Businesses Businesses . . . . . New 
Affiliates i.8' · Equipment Affiliat~~. <•·· : <f'c~uir,~ •··. :.· . ij~t~l>li,h,ed .. •· :i,J!iU~t,~> 
(billions US$) .. · (billions US$) 
. ·.' ... ": ,,, (till ions U!;$) · •· .. , · · (l>illions US$) . . (billic:>ns US$) · (thg11s·,n11.~ lJS$) 
1977 - 143.5 66.8 1,218.7 - - - -
1978 - 181.2 80.7 1,429.9 - - - -
1979 - 228.6 101.2 1,753.2 - - - -
1980 83.0 291.3 127.8 2,033.9 12.2 9.0 3.2 292.5 
1981 108.7 407.0 188.0 2,416.6 23.2 18.2 5.1 442.8 
1982 124.7 476.4 225.2 2,448.1 10.8 6.6 4.3 233.8 
1983 137.1 531.7 244.0 2,546.5 8.1 4.8 3.2 108.1 
1984 164.6 602.5 269.5 2,714.3 15.2 11.8 3.4 172.5 
1985 184.6 741.1 295.2 2,862.2 23.1 20.1 3.0 275.5 
1986 220.4 838.0 320.2 2,937.9 39.2 31.5 7.7 438.0 
1987 263.4 943.7 353.3 3,224.3 40.3 33.9 6.4 394.1 
1988 314.8 1,200.8 418.1 3,844.2 72.7 64.9 7.8 736.3 
1989 368.9 1,431.3 489.5 4,511.5 71.2 59.7 11.5 722.0 
1990 394.9 1,550.2 578.4 4,734.5 65.9 55.3 10.6 474.3 
1991 419.1 1,752.6 640.1 4,871.9 25.5 17.8 7.7 249.0 
1992 423.1 1,825.2 660.8 4,715.4 15.3 10.6 4.7 141.5 
1993 467.4 2,065.8 705.7 4,765.6 26.2 21.8 4.5 289.1 
1994 480.7 2,206.7 754.4 4,840.5 45.6 38.8 6.9 289.3 
1995 535.6 2,388.7 769.5 4,941.8 57.2 47.2 10.0 312.9 
1996 594.1 2,614.0 797.6 4,977.5 79.9 68.7 11.2 436.9 
1997 681.7 - - - 70.8 64.3 6.5 297.6 
Source for years 1980-90: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Investment Outlays by Country of Each Ultimate Beneficial Owner. 
Source for years 1991-97: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current Business, June 1998, pp. 42, http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/pubs.htm. 
·1 "" ,..-1 /1 / -, ,,--, ,-.,,.. ---,_ I---------,, ·, /'----., 
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This BEA source also garners data on the situation of investments, i.e. new reporting 
entities, in a given year, both nationally and by state. Columns 5 - 8 of Table 1 show those data 
at the national level, distinguishing between the start of foreign activity through the acquisition 
of an established entity and market entry accomplished through an entirely new or "greenfield" 
investment. 
A third set of available data has been gathered solely from secondary sources, mainly 
newspapers, magazines, press releases, and information provided directly by investing firms or 
other parties to the gathering agency. From such information, the International Trade 
Administration published a list of major increases in foreign activity in the United States 
including new businesses, acquisitions, expansions, and equity increases through 1995. Although 
this information has not been published since that time, it is apparently still being collected. 
Available data are shown in columns 4-9 of Table 2 and, for comparison, the first three columns 
give the BEA count of its recorded enterprises. 
IT A's activity served as a check on the completeness of BEA' s data by sometimes 
identifying entities that should be reporting but were not. Nonetheless, ITA has always admitted 
that its transaction compilation could not be as comprehensive as that of the BEA. In addition, 
IT A value figures, when available (not shown), may be inaccurate-only the very fact of the 
transaction was frequently recorded. Another major problem with the IT A data set lies in its 
asymmetry: increasing activity is recorded but diminished activity is not Gust as with the BEA 
data in columns 1-3 in Table 2). While this characteristic has given those data special appeal for 
the study of entry into the U.S. market (Caves, 1989) the data obviously provide no guide to net 
FDI change. 
5 
Table 2: Counts of New Foreign Activity in the U.S. (BEA and ITA Data) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
BEA BEA BEA ITA ITA ITA ITA ITA ITA 
Number of Number of Number of Number of Number of Number of Number of Number of... Other 
Entrants U.S. Businesses U.S. Businesses Acquisitions/ Equity 
Total Established 
. 
Acquired Mergers Increases 
1977 - - - - -
1978 - - - 225 36 
1979 - - - 344 39 
1980 1,659 938 721 344 47 
1981 1,333 871 462 291 39 
1982 1,108 713 395 231 42 
1983 775 493 282 192 39 
1984 764 449 315 245 43 
1985 753 363 390 367 33 
1986 1,040 485 555 420 51 
1987 978 435 543 547 63 
'1988 1,424 555 869 476 61 
1989 1,580 743 837 512 50 
1990 1,617 778 839 486 46 
1991 1,091 530 561 322 41 
1992 941 478 463 186 18 
1993 980 426 554 161 25 
1994 1,036 431 605 193 30 
1995 1,124 480 644 - -
996 1,155 469 686 - -
997 1,050 437 613 - -
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current Business, June 1998, pp. 39, 42, and 45. 
Source for ITA data: Foreign Direct Investment in the United States Series (1989 - missing volume). 
- ) ✓-- -"' ,.......---\ /-- ', ✓-) / - "" ,.,..----'\ ,,,.-----..... ( ·---.. ,,.--, <---------.. /-, ( --'\ / ----, '\ / "1 ,,,,.--...,, 
:~~m.t .. .. • ... ······ New Pcla~~!L . . ~aj<>f ~ijal E,,,!1:: { · Ventures • f>lant l:xpar1,i91J=:» : , . Purchasech}j. : · : . 
- - - -
26 85 149 156 
35 153 269 195 
41 199 350 218 
47 129 510 187 
50 99 . 298 193 
38 125 161 196 
50 170 126 272 
49 112 100 248 
57 161 121 239 
99 231 108 280 
91 162 93 200 
65 111 75 196 
78 147 14 247 
66 122 5 169 
50 100 0 158 
48 78 49 130 
44 147 22 148 
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
, /. : , , ,· i ,,. ." ,,------._ ,,...-~ ,,,..----------... ,/·-.. 
Like the balance of payments data, the financial and operating data are classified by the 
main industrial sector of the affiliate. Table 3 shows sectoral investment at the national level with 
several associated measures, some of which are also available for the states. These sectors will 
be examined in some detail at the state level later in this study, but one interesting fact stands out 
in the national data. The manufacturing sector, which in the overall U.S. economy accounts for 
only about 20 percent of total output, looms much larger in FDI. The manufacturing share of 
Gross Property Plant and Equipment has been very stable: it was 36.2 percent in 1977, 36.8 
percent in 1987, and 35.9 percent in 1996. The share of manufacturing FDI employment has 
been even larger in relation to the whole, although it has fallen somewhat: it was 54.3 percent in 
1980, 47.8 percent in 1987, and 44.5 percent in 1996. 
One explanation for the large manufacturing role relates to the very nature of direct 
investment. Direct investors are frequently firms that have long familiarity with the host country 
as exporters, and they see greater opportunities for market expansion if they increase their local 
presence. Because goods are far more heavily traded by the U.S. than services - despite the 
rapid growth of service trade, services comprised only 28 percent of exports and 18 percent of 
imports in 1990-an unusually large role for manufacturing may not be unexpected. While FDI 
is essential for some service trade, there may be greater economies of scale and international 
standardization in goods than in services, cultural barriers including language could act as a 
barrier to service trade, and far more services than goods remain subject to foreign investment 
restrictions-mainly maximum ownership percentages of individual firms. 
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Table 3: Selected Data of Nonbank U.S. Affiliates of Foreign Firms brJ~cl~stry of Affiliate, 1996 
Millions of dollars Millions of dollars 
Thousands Gross property, plant, 
Gross Compensation of of and equipment 
product Sales Net Income employees employees Total assets Of which: 
Total Commercial 
property 
All Industries 339,485 1,596,022 21,110 210,378 4,977.50 2,613,985 797,647 166,807 
Petroleum 32,733 152,832 5,586 6,525 111.8 114,735 118,588 7,040 
Petroleum and 23,099 73,358 3,725 4,015 67.2 70,418 89,907 5,33~ 
coal products 
manufacturina 
Other 9,634 79,474 1,861 2,510 44.5 44,317 28,681 1,70€ 
Manufacturing 156,354 552,023 7,153 104,004 2,213.60 578,886 286,029 9,4og 
Food and kindred 11,783 49,562 3,591 6,623 205.4 58,624 21,764 2,01€ 
products 
Chemicals and 42,095 134,451 549 24,633 409.8 180,996 91,005 1,942 
allied oroducts 
Primary and 16,079 62,902 1,010 10,969 233.3 60,804 35,123 833 
fabricated metals 
Machinery 31,863 124,066 -737 25,279 536.8 95,234 40,900 1,199 
Other 54,534 181,042 2,738 36,501 828.4 183,228 97,237 3,419 
manufacturinQ 
Wholesale trade 41,973 466,700 2,839 24,338 488.6 233,829 86,757 8,60! 
Motor vehicles 9,350 101,416 409 4,033 68.9 79,527 46,319 3,65( 
and eauioment 
Professional and 4,560 33,122 -149 3,270 66 17,687 4,838 401 
commercial 
Metals and 2,811 55,492 418 1,667 28.4 22,988 4,478 452 
minerals, except 
oetroleum 
Electrical goods 8,437 68,507 257 5,456 107.2 37,415 12,369 1,94e 
Machinery, 3,245 .41,448 365 1,925 39.7 19,853 3,253 344 
equipment, and 
suoolies 
Other durable 3,362 58,566 -302 2,536 57.6 14,256 4,456 687 
!goods 
-·--, ,--, ,---, / --.... ,,---._, /-· "- ~,, ,,--~ ' ( " ,,- ' ,,,..---"' /' ) /-~I ,,.---~ ,- "' ✓--"' ✓--,-. _.----,._ ~ ~--...... /---, ✓-- .._ 
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Table 3: Continued 
Millions of dollars Millions of dollars 
Thousands Gross property, plant, 
Gross Compensation of of and equipment 
product Sales Net Income employees employees Total assets Of which: 
Total Commercial 
orooertv Wholesale trade Groceries and 1,729 30,459 38 1,308 36.3 8,119 1,870 57€ 
continued related products 
Farm-product raw 1,085 34,508 244 650 18.1 8,668 2,143 13( 
materials 
Other nondurable 7,395 43,181 1,559 3,493 66.4 25,317 7,030 41£ laoods 
Retail trade 24,544 94,028 377 15,094 821 50,063 31,500 15,881 
General 563 1,811 -15 359 21.9 1,999 672 211 
merchandise 
stores 
Food stores 14,452 60,115 834 8,250 441.7 26,252 20,194 11,399 
Apparel and 2,376 8,524 -201 1,534 83.8 5,157 3,837 1,70~ 
accessorv stores 
Other 7,153 23,579 -241 4,951 273.6 16,656 6,797 2,56€ 
Finance, except 6,001 58,230 64 8,018 49.3 705,181 8,337 2,85.d depository 
I nstftutl ons 
Insurance 10,658 89,625 5,306 9,167 152 575,947 28,956 9,276 
Real estate 4,984 13,903 -1,718 1,006 27.1 100,549 90,180 79,34~ 
Table 3: Continued 
Millions of dollars Millions of dollars 
Thousands Of which: 
Gross Compensation of of 
product Sales Net Income employees employees Total assets Total Commercial 
property 
Services 21,840 56,247 -3,402 18,801 633.8 105,297 51,789 28,881 
Hotels and other 4,019 8,033 -678 2,453 109.9 31,041 25,142 20,760 
lodaing olaces 
Accounting, 1,164 3,902 -106 1,105 21.2 5,095 2,259 894 
Health services 2,704 5,999 -368 2,351 85.8 8,721 2,558 56 
Other services 1,830 4,819 -273 1,503 65 11,573 6,918 3,87 
Other Industries 40,398 112,434 4,907 23,424 480 149,497 95,512 5,512 
Agriculture, 667 2,204 -84 502 17.7 5,413 4,193 34: 
forestry, and 
Mining 5,486 11,802 769 2,618 41.6 28,032 23,707 153 
Construction 3,228 17,227 -516 3,278 69.1 10,675 4,886 2,081 
Transportation 11,533 32,884 667 9,208 170.1 27,667 10,058 2,022 
Communication 19,485 48,317 4,072 7,818 181.8 77,711 52,667 911 
and public utilities 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current Business, June 1998, http://www.bea.doc gov/bea/pubs.htm. 
- -~i ✓---"' ,..___.-----~ (/ ~1 ( ·, " ( ' /" ,' ' ' : ,' '· ' '· / ·1 / ' ,· ·1 / ·, , ' / ' 
,.----"\ (' ·-\ /"'" 
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A detailed examination of the source countries of FDI in the U.S. lies beyond the scope 
ofthis study. Only a few countries are responsible for most of it, however. In 1996, seven 
countries accounted for 80 percent of the gross product of all affiliates in the U.S. (yet another 
measure of affiliate activity). In descending order of importance, they were the United Kingdom 
(21.8 percent), Japan (16.l percent), Germany (11.9 percent), France (9.6), Canada (8.8 percent), 
the Netherlands (8.6 percent), and Switzerland (5.7 percent). These rankings change over the 
years, sometimes substantially. For example, France increased its share by one-third between 
1995 and 1996, moving ahead of Canada (Fahim-Nader and Zeile, 1998: 48-49). Such shifts 
reflect that the lion's share of many home countries' investments are in the hands of only a few 
firms-sometimes only one or two-and the changing fortunes and strategies of those firms can 
shift source countries' shares substantially. 
DIRECT INVESTMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY 
Although some have questioned whether the increased role ofFDI was altogether a 
positive development for the United States (Tolchin and Tolchin, 1987), official U.S. policy has 
remained positive about FDI throughout, and state governments in the 1980s eagerly sought 
foreign investment as they also attempted to expand exports. Both measures were rightly 
regarded as means whereby overall state wealth, and its imperfect but politically salient 
correlate, "jobs," could be encouraged. By 1987 all but two states had identifiable parts of state 
government engaged in some kind of international business development, and nearly all states 
claimed to be actively recruiting foreign investors. Although foreign investors have been subject 
to certain controls, especially in agricultural land, finance, and insurance, the author knows of no 
attempt to discourage investment outside of statutorily restricted areas. 
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The 1980s were a time of struggle for the states. The federal government cut federal taxes 
while reducing revenue passthrough to the states, thus substantially increasing the service burden 
placed upon them. Until late in the decade, this problem was dramatically exacerbated by the 
rapid contraction of a range of industries blasted by foreign competition greatly sharpened by the 
ascendant dollar. 
Minnesota shared in the national enthusiasm for international business development. The 
Perpich administration began in 1981 with very public behavior aimed at broadening state 
business horizons. The Governor made a series of highly publicized international trips, he began 
the Minnesota Trade Office, and he chose a commission that recommended the site for the World 
Trade Center (Kudrle and Kite, 1988). The World Trade Center was completed in 1984. 
Table 4 shows the employment generated by FDI in 1996 by state and sector as well as 
the size of that employment in relation to that sector's total employment in the state. From these 
data, Minnesota scarcely stands out as a host to foreign direct investment. Its FDI-controlled 
share of private employment was slightly below the simple national average of all of the states 
for total investment-3.5 versus 3.6 percent-and below each of the sectoral subcategories 
except Real Estate and "Other Industries." From a policy standpoint, however, we want to know 
how well Minnesota is doing by comparison with its potential. If we knew, for example, that 
states with warm winters were drawing hugely disproportionate shares of FDI, the Minnesota 
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Table 4: Sector Employment from FDI by State and in Relation to Total State Sectoral Employment, 1996 
All Manufac- Wholesale Retail Finance, Insurance Real Services Other 






········· ····••··.•·· ; ... .:t ... Alabama 61,400 3.2% 37,900 9.8% 8,800 9.3% 3,200 1.0% 0 0.0% 600 2.5% 0 0.0% 6,600 1.5% 3,000 0.5% 
Arizona 56,700 2.8% 17,900 8.9% 4,000 3.9% 14,300 3.8% 250 0.5% 1,750 5.5% 300 0.9% 8,900 1.5% 5,500 0.9% 
Arkansas 35,100 3.0% 22,900 9.0% 3,500 7.1% 3,200 1.6% 0 0.0% 600 5.3% 100 1.1% 2,500 1.0% 1,500 0.4% California 545,300 3.9% 194,500 10.5% 93,200 12.3% 65,300 2.8% 4,300 1.6% 17,200 7.9% 6,300 3.3% 109,600 2.5% 49,500 1.2% Colorado 69,800 3.4% 19,400 9.8% 6,300 6.3% 14,100 3.7% 700 1.9% 4,400 12.4% 400 1.3% 10,200 1.7% 12,600 1.9% Connecticut 83,300 5.0% 35,800 12.9% 9,000 11.0% 24,600 8.9% 600 1.9% 2,400 3.3% 300 1.9% 6,300 1.2% 3,200 0.8% 
Delaware 15,400 3.9% 7,500 12.9% 300 2.1% 3,000 4.2% 0 0.0% 1,750 24.0% 0 0.0% 1,600 1.5% 250 0.2% 
Florida 214,400 3.2% 64,600 13.1% 17,800 5.3% 47,400 3.6% 600 0.4% 5,300 4.3% 2,800 2.5% 42,500 1.9% 30,100 1.6% 
Georgia 185,900 4.9% 87,900 15.0% 22,200 9.3% 19,700 2.9% 1,000 1.4% 7,600 12.1% 1,100 2.9% 24,300 2.5% 20,300 1.8% 
Idaho 11,700 2.2% 3,100 4.2% 1,000 3.4% 5,500 5.5% 0 0.0% 400 6.1% 0 0.0% 900 0.7% 700 0.4% 
Illinois 229,700 3.9% 117,500 12.1% 27,000 7.8% 19,400 2.0% 4,300 3.1% 9,100 6.5% 400 0.7% 25,800 1.5% 20,000 1.3% 
Indiana 124,900 4.3% 90,400 13.3% 9,600 6.8% 9,100 1.6% 200 0.4% 2,200 4.6% 0 0.0% 7,700 1.1% 4,700 0.6% 
Iowa 36,300 2.5% 23,200 9.3% 1,600 1.9% 1,800 0.7% 0 0.0% 2,700 7.1% 0 0.0% 1,400 0.4% 5,500 1.4% 
Kansas 41,300 3.1% 16,200 6.2% 6,300 8.3% 2,900 1.2% 100 0.4% 2,200 9.8% 0 0.0% 2,300 0.7% 10,000 2.3% 
Kentucky 84,100 4.7% 55,600 17.7% 12,800 15.5% 3,600 1.1% 100 0.3% 500 2.5% 0 0.0% 6,100 1.4% 4,600 0.9% 
Louisiana 54,400 2.8% 17,300 9.1% 3,200 3.4% 8,800 2.6% 0 0.0% 1,100 4.2% 0 0.0% 8,000 1.5% 5,400 0.8% 
Maine 30,600 5.3% 11,900 13.4% 1,300 5.0% 12,700 11.1% 0 0.0% 500 4.4% 0 0.0% 1,300 0.8% 750 0.4% 
Maryland 94,500 4.0% 30,500 17.4% 5,700 5.2% 33,600 7.7% 500 1.1% 4,300 11.0% 300 0.8% 9,500 1.2% 8,600 1.1% 
Massachusetts 163,200 5.1% 60,300 13.5% 9,000 5.3% 54,500 10.0% 1,000 1.5% 7,200 9.9% 600 2.0% 23,000 2.0% 7,100 1.0% 
Michigan 157,300 3.5% 80,400 8.2% 13,900 6.3% 18,900 2.3% 700 0.8% 2,800 4.1% 200 0.5% 19,100 1.5% 17,200 1.6% 
Minnesota 88,900 3.5% 46,500 10.8% 3,500 2.3% 4,400 1.0% 300 0.7% 2,900 5.1% 500 2.0% 5,700 0.8% 25,000 3.8% 
Mississippi 21,600 1.8% 12,400 5.0% 2,400 5.3% 2,000 1.0% 0 0.0% 400 3.2% O 0.0% 2,700 1.0% 1,300 0.3% 
Missouri 83,600 3.1% 45,300 10.8% 9,600 6.6% 5,700 1.2% 1,750 3.1% 3,700 8.0% 300 1.1% 5,300 0.7% 10,800 1.4% 
Montana 4,200 1.1% 800 3.3% 100 0.5% 1,200 1.5% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 500 0.5% 1,500 1.1% 
Nebraska 18,100 2.0% 9,000 7.9% 900 1.7% 1,700 1.1% 0 0.0% 700 2.9% 0 0.0% 4,400 1.9% 1,300 0.5% 
Nevada. 25,000 2.8% 6,000 15.3% 1,200 3.6% 4,800 3.4% o, 0.0% 100 1.1% 300 2.0% 2,600 0.7% 9,300 3.6% 
New Hampshire 30,200 5.3% 17,100 16.3% 1,000 3.7% 8,600 7.2% 0 0.0% 1,000 7.5% 0 0.0% 600 0.4% 750 0.5% 
NewJersey 206,500 5.5% 94,300 19.5% 32,400 11.9% 29,900 5.0% 3,300 4.8% 8,300 9.6% 600 1.6% 23,700 2.0% 12,900 1.2% 
New Mexico 15,400 2.1% 4,300 9.4% 800 2.9% 3,500 2.5% 0 0.0% 100 1.3% 100 1.3% 1,700 0.8% 3,600 1.2% 
New York 345,400 4.2% 105,400 11.3% 35,200 8.2% 75,500 6.1% 24,200 10.8% 24,100 13.1% 5,400 3.5% 48,800 1.7% 25,000 1.1% 
Table 4: Continued 
All Manufac- Wholesale Retail Finance, Insurance Real Services Other 
Industries turing except Estate Industries 
Depository 
Institutions 
North Carolina 225,800 5.9% 120,300 14.2% 16,700 9.2% 45,400 7.0% 300 0.4% 4,100 8.9% 300 1.0% 13,000 1.5% 25,100 2.2% 
North Dakota 4,800 1.5% 2,200 10.0% 200 0.9% 200 0.3% 0 0.0% 300 6.2% 0 0.0% 1,600 1.7% 200 0.2% 
Ohio 223,600 4.0% 136,700 12.4% 13,400 4.7% 31,200 3.0% 100 0.1% 3,000 3.2% 100 0.2% 18,400 1.2% 10,700 0.8% 
Oklahoma 35,000 2.4% 17,200 9.8% 3,700 5.6% 4,400 1.7% 300 1.1% 700 3.5% 100 0.7% 4,200 1.1% 1,200 0.2% 
Oregon 49,100 3.1% 18,500 7.8% 9,600 10.7% 9,900 3.5% 300 1.0% 1,500 6.1% 200 0.9% 5,100 1.2% 3,800 0.8% 
Pennsylvania 234,300 4.2% 118,900 12.7% 16,800 6.4% 37,800 3.9% 900 0.8% 5,700 4.5% 200 0.4% 18,500 1.1% 34,200 2.5% 
Rhode Island 19,300 4.1% 8,100 9.8% 1,500 8.0% 6,600 8.1% 0 0.0% 300 3.1% 0 0.0% 1,800 1.2% 900 0.8% 
South Carolina 116,000 6.4% 68,500 18.6% 7,000 10.3% 23,600 6.9% 0 0.0% 1,750 7.5% 200 1.1% 7,900 1.9% 6,100 1.1% 
South Dakota 5,200 1.4% 2,900 6.0% 300 1.5% 800 1.1% 0 0.0% 200 4.0% 0 0.0% 400 0.4% 700 0.6% 
Tennessee 133,600 5.0% 80,600 15.5% 13,700 9.6% 13,700 2.9% 0 0.0% 2,600 7.0% 100 0.5% 13,800 2.0% 8,300 1.2% 
Texas 316,900 3.6% 128,000 12.1% 30,900 6.4% 40,000 2.6% 1,100 0.7% 6,600 4.5% 1,800 1.6% 52,300 2.2% 25,800 0.9% 
Utah 32,900 3.3% 10,800 8.4% 1,200 2.5% 7,800 4.2% 0 0.0% 300 2.0% 0 0.0% 8,200 3.0% 4,400 1.4% 
Vermont 9,800 ,3.4% 3,400 7.3% 2,100 16.5% 2,300 4.3% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1,400 1.6% 500 0.6% 
Virginia 141,200 4.1% 50,000 12.4% 9,500 6.5% 46,300 7.9% 500 0.7% 1,100 2.5% 200 0.5% 14,000 1.5% 18,900 1.6% 
Washington 86,000 3.3% 30,700 8.9% 7,500 5.1% 20,200 4.4% 200 0.5% 2,800 6.8% 400 1.2% 13,200 1.9% 10,400 1.2% 
West Virginia 26,300 3.7% 11,400 13.8% 2,200 7.2% 3,800 2.8% 0 0.0% 100 1.3% 0 0.0% 2,600 1.4% 5,300 2.1% 
Wisconsin 70,700 2.6% 46,000 7.6% 3,300 2.5% 6,600 1.4% 0 0.0% 3,200 5.2% 0 0.0% 6,600 1.0% 4,200 0.6% 
Wyoming 6,100 2.6% 2,500 23.0% 300 4.0% 1,300 2.8% 0 0.0% 100 4.1% 0 0.0% 400 0.8% 1,200 1.1% 
Average% 3.6% 11.4% 6.2% 3.7% 0.8% 5.8% 0.8% 1.4% 1.2% 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Operations of U.S. Affiliates of Foreign Companies, Table G7, http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/uguide.htm#_ 1_23. 
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Common sense suggests perhaps three broad categories of possible state level 
determinants of FDI. First, there are elements that stand essentially as parameters of the state's 
appeal. Minnesotans can do little about their weather or their geographic location, for example. 
A second category concerns developments with a long timeframe such as the age and educational 
structure of the population and the overall pattern of economic activity in the state; they may be 
influenced by policy, but change is slow. A third category receives the most attention. This 
relates to the constituent elements of what is usually referred to as the state's "business climate." 
Issues such as taxes, the structure of public expenditures, and labor legislation are included here. 
Some such measures can be considerably adjusted even in the short run. Equally apparent, 
however, is the possibility of policy reversal. A shift in the public mood and a new set of 
politicians could undo tomorrow measures that are taken today. This reduces the appeal of more 
attractive policies unless they have been in place for a long time or the stability of which can 
otherwise be persuasively argued. 
WHAT DETERMINES THE STATE LOCATION 
OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT? 
Whatever the relative importance of the factors determining foreign investment, 
statistical analysis could clearly be useful. From the beginning of the surge ofFDI in the late 
1970s, analysts in geography and regional economics have attempted to pin down the 
determinants of state-and sometimes regional or county level-locational choice. There have 
been many substantial studies over the years, most of them concentrating on the manufacturing 
sector, which, ·as noted earlier, has accounted for nearly half of FDI employment over the entire 
period under consideration. No attempt will be made here to summarize their findings -in detail-
indeed, the sheer passage of time has rendered some early results outdated. Our purpose in 
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considering certain elements of previous work, however, is twofold. First, they can serve as a 
guide to variables that should be explored in the present study. Second, because, as explained 
later, the approach used here will severely limit the ability to identify significant_ variables, the 
results of other studies might provide important complementary information for the present 
work. And so too might be results of studies aimed at the determinants of interstate differences 
in overall economic growth. Some studies attempt to compare and contrast the determinants of 
FDI with those for domestically-owned activity (e.g., Glickman and Woodward, 1987). 
Although the following categories have apparently not been used before, it appears that 
previous work sees the state level determinants of direct investment as falling into four major 
categories: location, size, economic structure and factor availability, and policy issues. 
Location 
State location is certain to be a factor in the siting of FDI for four broad sets of reasons. 
First, before the surge of the late 1970s, FDI in the U.S. was mainly in the states of the 
Northeast. The most obvious interpretation for that pattern stems from the familiarity of 
Canadians· and Europeans with that part of the country. These areas had traditionally served as 
their entrepot for sales into the U.S. market, and some directly-owned import-substituting 
activity was already in place. 
The dominant industrial organization approach to the determinants of direct investment 
(Caves, 1971)3 sees overseas activities by firms as a net of special advantages and disadvantages. 
One of the special disadvantages is not "knowing the territory." America is a large country, both 
3 The industrial organization approach, one that stresses imperfections in specific goods and services markets, has 
largely displaced other emphases, notably international differences in the cost of capital. For a discussion, see 
Graham and Krugman, 1995, Appendix B. 
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legally and culturally; this poses problems of fixed information costs to incoming firms. These 
costs can be cut both by locating where the firm has previous activity, i.e. importing, and. perhaps 
where other foreigners, especially from the same country, have experience working in the local 
milieu. This suggests the possibility that in both the early days of substantial FDI and later as 
well, some kinds of economies of agglomeration and path dependence for foreign firms might be _ 
at work. The clustering of many German-owned firms in South Carolina is sometimes cited as an 
example. Glickman and Woodward's model of the distribution 9f FDI in the United States in the 
1970s ( and for some years thereafter) includes a variable called "bordercoast" that includes the 
coastal states of the northern manufacturing belt along with Maine, Vermont, and New 
Hampshire (Glickman and Woodward, 1987: 56) to capture the possible tendency ofFDI to 
grow where it was historically planted. 
Proximity to other markets provides a second reason for the importance of location. Some 
of this is based on sheer distance and some on the extent to which infrastructural investments 
have been made that increase the locational advantage of a state. 4 Established domestic industry, 
of course, also may draw foreign suppliers, customers, competitors, and acquirers, but this factor 
is probably more usefully regarded as an element of the economic structure of the state. 
Tennessee and Kentucky provide examples of state locational advantage for heavy 
industry. They are close to large sales markets, they are well served by both rail and highway 
transport, and, to use a specific but very important instance, they are quite close to nearly all 
elements of the automobile industry. 
4 Infrastructural expenditure has, in general, been hard to identify as a source of general growth (Munnell, 1990; 
Crandall, 1993: 3 8). This may result from some combination of infrastructural expenditures based on political rather 
than economic payout and the great heterogeneity of expenditures that are classified in that category. 
17 
Some statistical models have attempted to isolate the importance of location by including 
a variable for the distance of a state from the country's prime manufacturing area (Wheat, 1973). 
This approach grows from a preoccupation with manufacturing, and its usefulness elsewhere has 
remained largely unexplored. 
A state's natural climate provides yet another location-specific advantage. Before the 
Second World War, the heat and humidity of the South muted its attraction, but air-conditioning 
appears to have allowed the South and Southwest to be seen as an unambiguously more 
attractive place to live for many Americans than the Northeast, the Great Lakes, and the Upper 
Midwest5 ( along with many social changes that were made in part to attract outsiders and were 
subsequently accelerated by their presence). In an open economy, people tend to go_ where jobs 
are, but the process is mutually causal, and people will work for lower money incomes in places 
where they would rather live, all else equal. The period of greatest FDI expansion in the U.S. 
also saw substantial migration of domestically-owned manufacturing industry southward and 
westward-away from what became known as the Rustbelt (Glickman and Woodward, 1987, 
1989; Crandall, 1993). In recognition of the attractions of the newly popular areas, some measure 
of climate, such as mean January temperature, is often included in statistical analysis (see, for 
example, Crandall, 1993 :29-41 ). 
A final locational variable is energy costs. Some states have, or are close to, cheap 
sources of energy, which are posited to be a critical concern in much of manufacturing. Some 
studies have found state energy costs to be a statistically significant, if not always substantially 
important, apparent determinant of interstate variation in manufacturing location. Other recent 




been discovered, suggesting that the correlation may be spurious. (Ondrich and Waslyenko, 
1993:90-95; Crandall, 1993: 37). 
Other resource determinants of direct investment are so obviously site-specific that they 
are usually ignored in the analysis of direct investment. For example, there is, as far as the author 
knows, no serious attempt to explain interstate variation in petroleum extraction. Only a few 
states are in the running, and statistical analysis would be very difficult. The same argument 
applies to various categories of mining. 
The economic size of a state provides perhaps the most obvious variable to employ for 
explaining variations among the states in FDI. Yet a couple of early studies did not attempt to 
control for it (Little, 1978; McConnell, 1980), assuming perhaps that, whatever its importance 
when other factors were held constant, it was simply too far down on the list of probable real 
world determinants to be worth bothering with. The overwhelming majority of studies of state 
level investment do include some measure of a state's economic size, however. Size is measured 
variously by population, personal income, or gross state product. The growth of a state's total 
activity could be important, as well. If two states have the same total economic size, but one is 
growing while the other is stagnant or falling, the former state should be more attractive to 
foreign ( and domestic) investors as a sales market. 
5 For a brief discussion of the internal migration of people and industry in postwar America, see Crandall, 1993; 
Chapter 1. 
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Economic Structure and Factor Availability 
FDI in essence "latches on" to state economies that are invariably and overwhelmingly 
determined by non-FDI activity. After all, even the heaviest level of FDI, that in South Carolina, 
only accounted for 6.4 percent of total employment in 1996. The economic structure of the state 
may matter a great deal for incoming investors. On a priori grounds, critical factors could be 
expected to differ greatly by sector, however. Once again, by far the greater part of existing 
research has focused on manufacturing. A variable employed by Plaut and Pluta (1983) for 
general manufacturing investment was also found by Glickman and Woodward to correlate quite 
strongly with manufacturing FDI in the early 1980s. The variable attempts to capture a supply-
demand imbalance by devising a ratio variable. The "top" of the ratio is a sum of terms, each of 
which is the personal income of another state divided by the squared distance of the center of the 
state being considered to the center of that other state squared (the distance of the state to itself is 
one half of the average radius of the state). The "bottom" of the ratio involves similar 
expressions but with manufacturing employment in the numerator. The greater the ratio is, the 
greater is the "deficit" of manufacturing activity in the state and hence presumably the greater 
the attraction of the state for foreign investors. 
Although the ratio variable appears to "work," for manufacturing FDI in the early 1980s, 
as Glickman and Woodward acknowledge, one might have doubts about its applicability even on 
a priori grounds. Except for some distribution and transportation costs savings, it is hard to see 
why the supply and demand for manufactures should closely match at the state level. On the 
other hand, it is even harder to see any usefulness for the approach in explaining service activity 
that requires proximate delivery. In such sectors, significant imbalance would not be expected to 









The apparent success of the imbalance variable could be attributable at least in part to the 
fact that lower wages were attracting investment to the same places that were growing rapidly 
because people wanted to live there, perhaps in some cases at lower real wages than in the areas 
they left. 
Wheat (1986) rejects the supply-demand imbalance variable just discussed on both 
empirical and theoretical grounds. He concludes that, whether the variable correlates with direct 
investment or not, it combines factors in a way that makes meaningful interpretation impossible. 
Instead, he suggests dividing the examination of the role of geography in manufacturing location 
into two separate considerations: 1) state level, i.e. local, supply-demand imbalance and 2) 
distance from the traditional manufacturing areas of the country. He multiplies a measure of 
imbalance against integer values of the distance from Pittsburgh ("ZONE") for a variable he calls 
"demand," which is intended to identify attractive investment opportunities (its expected sign is 
positive). 
THE APPROACH OF THIS STUDY 
This study's ultimate purpose is to see how well Minnesota has fared in attracting direct 
investment. The approach taken will try to emphasize "the big picture" and to place the results in 
an easily understood context. In so doing, both the statistical and the narrative approach will be 
quite straightforward. This contrasts sharply with some recent research. Coughlin et al (1991) 
and Ondrich and Wasylenko (1993), for example, provide highly complex models of 
manufacturing plant location. These models attempt to isolate the contributions of various factors 
to a location decision, holding other factors constant, but the results are not always consistent 
among studies ( or perhaps stable over time) and do not deal at all with the 60 percent of direct 
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investment that is not in manufacturing. Moreover, in their understandable desire to reach 
beyond the limitations of a simple single equation model of a state's FDI position-a problem to 
be discussed in a moment-how much that overall position differs from other states and the 
reasons for those differences may be completely lost. In general, there appears to be a gap in the 
literature between purely descriptive writing about state performance and highly specialized 
studies of certain kinds of investment. Therefore, despite some innate limitations, this study 
takes the opposite tack. This work will look at Minnesota in the context of the performance of all 
forty-eight contiguous other states and will do so for eight sectors as well as for total investment. 
Alaska and Hawaii are not considered here or in most other studies. In addition to their 
lack of direct physical connection to the other states, a factor that alone would make their 
consideration difficult, each has unique attractions as a host for FDI related to its natural resource 
endowment. Alaska is host to much of the country's petroleum investment while Hawaii is a 
vacation paradise relatively close to the Far East and has therefore drawn very high levels of 
foreign real estate investment, mainly from Japan. Both states attract high levels of FDI but for 
reasons that are largely insensitive to conditions in other states. 
This investigation will follow the lead of the BEA and put most emphasis on employment 
figures in exploring the various sectors of FDI. Although both state gross property plant and 
equipment and employment both have good claims on attention, the latter data are classified 
among sectors more accurately because employment can be assigned on the basis of industry of 
· sales rather than the industry of affiliate. For example, many major foreign automobile affiliates 
have all of their gross property plant and equipment classified as ''manufacturing" because that is 
the primary activity.of the affiliate even though a large part of their activity is in fact in 
wholesaling. The state employment data generally make the appropriate distribution while the 
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physical capital measures do not. Gross product estimates are similarly limited (for more 
information, see Fahim-Nader and Zeile, 1998: 52). 
This study will first look at specific sectors of investment: manufacturing, retail, 
wholesale, financial, insurance, real estate, services, and other investment. These are the 
categories broken out by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. This is followed by an attempt to 
explain total investment. 
This analysis looks at the entire accumulation of FDI activity across the states for the 
year 1996. The great rush to increase investment into the U.S. that began in the late 1970s was 
largely spent by the early 1990s. In other words, the spurt that increased FDI from 2. 7 percent in 
1980 to a high water mark of 5.3 percent of private employment in 1991 took place over only a 
decade. The period since has mainly seen consolidation with employment varying slightly 
around 5.0 percent over the ensuing years through 1996. 
The use of accumulated investment activity results in part from a desire to maximize the 
number of observations. For many states and many sectors, there is little change in employment 
or investment from year to year. Far more importantly, the short period changes that are 
observed are often generated by temporary economic conditions (including those in the home 
country of the investing firm) 6 or firm-specific short-term behavior that have little if anything to 
do with a state's fundamental attractiveness as a site for FDI. 
The values of specific variables used to explain the accumulated stock across the states 
are typically drawn from the early or mid-1990s. The use of values for some earlier time, perhaps 
the very beginning of the period, might strike some as more appropriate. The choice made here 
can be defended. In very few states has direct investment itself had a large effect on the state's 
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overall economic fortunes. Thus, the chain of causation is almost entirely from observed state 
characteristics to the state's attractiveness to direct investors, and the relative economic 
conditions of a state can be forecast with some accuracy for a number of years in advance. If the 
really unexpected transpires, investment activity can usually be expanded or contracted over a 
fairly short period of time. We therefore expect that the total volume of investment in a state in a _ 
given year should quite closely match the state's attractiveness in that year. 
Important limitations flow from the use of the state as the unit of analysis. Forty-eight is 
quite a small number for statistical analysis. The small size makes it difficult to isolate the 
contributions of variables, particularly when their own variation is small or when their 
movements are correlated with each other. And each additional variable increases the seriousness 
of this problem. To maximize the usefulness of the study, an attempt will be made to exclude 
independent variables that have high levels of correlation with variables included. 
The earlier discussion stressed the possible importance of at least four broad categories of 
determinant, and this project has explored dozens of variables identified from previous studies. 
In general, these variables have not showed a high and robust level of correlation with alternative 
measures of accumulated foreign activity in various sectors. Even the most formal "trawling" 
approach, stepwise regression, produces very few significant associations and fewer still that are 
likely to result from other than spurious correlation. Some variables, however, have both 
important theoretical foundation for the study and also show some life in multiple regression. In 
each of the following sections several regressions will be shown. A central objective is to 
discover how Minnesota is doing by looking at its distance above or below the regression plane: 
what is unexplained by those factors included in the equation. Although all of the residuals will 





be derived from just one equation, these residuals are not highly sensitive to the precise 
specification. 
From the plethora of possible explanatory variables, some appear more promising on 
theoretical grounds than others, and each a priori important dimension of a state's attractiveness 
will be considered. Gross state product provides the most comprehensive measure of a state's 
total economic activity. If foreign investment were attracted equally by state economic activity of 
all kinds, this variable would explain all of it. While that extreme assumption cannot be expected 
to hold, total size measured by GSP is expected to have a strong and positive influence on 
investment. 
It also makes sense that, for any given size of state, investment might be larger in 
anticipation of future demand from within that state. The second variable included in the 
equation is a measure of the rate of growth of GSP between 1980 and 1996. 
This study also hypothesizes the importance of the economic structure of the state. For 
example, if a state has a high level of manufacturing activity, it might be expected to provide 
fertile soil for foreign activity in that sector, again holding all else equal. More important, 
because 80-90 percent of all entering FDI takes place through acquisition, the size of the sector 
roughly indexes the opportunity for such acquisition (the acquisition figure is for all total 
investment, however, and is not broken down to the sector level). 
Variables concerning a state's location are also considered. One is related to the historical 
argument made by Glickman and Woodward about entry into the United States: Europeans 
traditionally entered and gained experience through the Northeast. This might be complemented 
by the recognition that investment from the Far East and especially Japan, frequently began with 
' 
aggregate investment by area will be made at the end of this report, however. 
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activity on the West Coast. Hence, at various points in this analysis two "border" variables are 
employed: one to try to trace the roots of investment back to the 1970s: Border 1; and the other to 
recognize the more varied range of sources in the 1980s and later: Border2 (Glickman and 
Woodward's measure augmented by the three West Coast states). At least for manufacturing, 
one also wants to test Wheat's hypothesis about the separate contribution of local supply and 
demand imbalance and the distance of that imbalance from the traditional manufacturing center 
(Pittsburgh). 
Finally, some variables are explored that reflect public policy and have been found 
important in other recent, well designed studies. One is the level of unionization of the work 
force. While a state does not determine whether a worker joins a union or not, so-called "right to 
work" legislation, now in force in twenty states, effectively diminishes union power by removing 
the requirement of a person's union membership ( or the payment of a compensatory fee) as a 
condition of continuing employment at a particular workplace. Because unionization is positively 
correlated with average pay (.65), that variable is also used to compare its performance with that 
of unionization. Two other policy variables have received much attention in recent work (see 
especially Ondrich and Waslyenko, 1993: 143): state expenditure on higher education and state 
corporate income taxes; both of these are entered on a per capita basis. 







Table 5: Regression Variables 
Source Variable Name Description 










Wholesale sector by percentage of total employment size for 1980, '87, or '96 
Retail sector size by percentage of total employment for 1980, '87, or '96 
Finance sector size by percentage of total employment for 1980, '87, or '96 
Insurance sector size by percentage of total employment for 1980, '87, or '96 
Real Estate sector size by percentage of total employment for 1980, '87, or '96 
Service sector size by percentage of total employment for 1980, and '87, or '96 
Gross State Product for 1980, '87, or '96 
Growth in Gross State Product 
Glickman and Woodward's "bordercoast" variable 
BORDER2 Glickman and Woodward's "bordercoast" variable plus Pacific Coast states 
UNION Union membership as percentage of workers in 1995 
ZONE Measure of distance from manufacturing belt 
CORPER • State corporate income tax rate 
HEXPER Higher education expenditures 
AVEPA Y Average hourly wage rate 
MANEMP_ Total manufacturing employment in 1980, '87, or '96 due to FOi 
WSEMP_ Total wholesale employment in 1980, '87, or '96 due to FOi 
RETEMP_ Total retail employment in 1980, '87, or '96 due to FOi 
FINEMP_ Total finance employment in 1980, '87, or '96 due to FOi 
INSEMP_ Total insurance employment in 1980, '87, or '96 due to FOi 
REEMP_ Total real estate employment in 1980, '87, or '96 due to FDI 
SRVEMP_:,_ Total service employment in 1980, '87, or '96 due to FOi 
OTHEMP _ Total other employment in 1980, '87, or '96 due to FOi 
TOTEMP_, : Total employment in 1980, '87, or '96 due to FOi 
XEN Laws against foreign ownership 
CORP Laws proposed and in place against corporate ownership 
BEA: Survey of Current Business 
BEA: Survey of Current Business 
BEA: Survey of Current Business 
BEA: Survey of Current Business 
BEA: Survey of Current Business 
BEA: Survey of Current Business 
BEA: Survey of Current Business 
BEA: Survey of Current Business 
Glickman and Woodward (1987) 
The Bureau of National Affairs - Union Membership and Earnings Data Book 
Wheat (1986) 
Federation of Tax Administrators (www.taxadmin.org) 
The National Center for Education Statistics - Digest of Education Statistics 
~.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics - Employment and Earnings 
BEA: Survey of Current Business 
BEA: Survey of Current Business 
BEA: Survey of Current Business 
BEA: Survey of Current Business 
BEA: Survey of Current Business 
BEA: Survey of Current Business 
BEA: Survey of Current Business 
BEA: Survey of Current Business 
BEA: Survey of Current Business 
Laband (1984) 
Laband (1984) 
INVESTMENT BY SECTOR 
Manufacturing Investment 
This study rests on the assumption that all categories of direct investment should not be 
motivated similarly by the same state level variables. Thus, it makes sense to start with sectoral 
investment before considering higher levels of aggregation. 
The most natural place to begin the analysis is with manufacturing, which has received 
the highest level of past attention. Table Ml shows some straightforward multiple regression 
equations employing the variables just described. As hypothesized, the size of the state 
apparently has a strong and positive impact on foreign manufacturing investment, as does the 
relative size of the state's manufacturing sector. State product is entered in thousands of dollars 
and the size of the state sector as a decimal fraction, while our variable of concern, employment 
related to FDI, is in thousands. Thus, the results suggest that, all else equal, an additional million 
dollars of state product will be associated with an additional FDI manufacturing employment of 
between 211 and 256 persons. Holding the gross product of the state ( and everything else) 
constant, a one percentage point increase in manufacturing' s share in state employment will raise 
FDI manufacturing employment by between 2,600 and over 3,000 persons. 
Neither the growth rate nor the level of unionization apparently has any effect, and 
average pay is positive at a very low level of significance. Surprisingly in light of the earlier 
discussion, both location measures shown take an unexpected sign and yet are quite significant 
(the significance levels for all variables are reported as two-tailed tests). ZONE is the distance 
from Pittsburgh that Wheat uses to magnify-on the assumption of greater physical isolation-
state level supply_ and demand imbalance in manufacturing, but that cannot happen if it takes the 







combination "demand" variable did not produce the expected sign and in light of Crandall's use 
of ZONE standing alone (1993: 36-60). 
ZONE could be entered with a different a priori expectation from that given by Wheat, 
and that is the one apparently supported here: Distance from the manufacturing belt makes 
manufacturing foreign investment less likely. The discrepancy between this finding and those of 
Wheat and Crandall, who find new manufacturing investment filling unmet needs, could be 
attributed to a greater dependence on previous manufacturing investment by foreign investors in 
comparison with all new manufacturing activity, the focus of their research. This is especially 
likely given the overwhelming importance of entry through acquisition. 
The negative sign for Border2, which will be seen in other sectors (typically to increase 
the foreign investment role), does not imply that having an ocean coastline somehow deters 
manufacturing investment. It means merely that the factors leading to manufacturing activity 
have not generally attached to coastal states and do not do so for FDI either. 
The other variables in the equations, CORPER and HEXPER, do not signify. These 
results, and similar results presented later for other sectors, do not refute the possible importance 
of these variables but may simply stem from the lack of power of the statistical approach taken 
here. The equations explain over 85 percent of all of the variation in manufacturing FDI 
employment among the forty-eight states with 75 percent explained by the size of the state alone. 
Despite the preference of this study for an emphasis on employment, a brief comparison 
will be made between the employment results and those for the total value of property plant and 
equipment for each sector. In this and all of the other results shown in later sections, Gross 
Property, Plant and Equipment values are measured in millions of current dollars. 
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Table M2 shows one representative result; the variables appear to have broadly the same 
impact for value as for employment. Total size of the state and the relative size of the 
manufacturing sector dominate the explanation, and FDI activity drops off with distance from the 
traditional manufacturing centers. About three-quarters of total variation is explained. 
Another issue of interest is in the change or stability of the determinants of FDI 
employment over time. The results are shown in Table M3. This is far easier to track for the 
largest sectors, such as manufacturing, than for smaller ones because moving back in time does 
not cause as many states to drop out of the analysis. There is a change in sign of the original (Old 
Northeast) Borderl variable, but, as pointed out for Border2, this can only be interpreted as 
spurious correlation anyway. The shift in the focus of activity that the Border! reflects rather 
than causes, however, is manifest in the relative sector size variable: it went up rapidly between 
1980 and 1987 and especially during the period between 1987 and 1996 while the determining 
role of state size alone seems to have diminished. There is little change in the overall fit the 
equation over time. 
A straightforward means of considering Minnesota's relative performance is employed 
here. Correcting for the factors presented in the equation shown in Table Ml :1, Minnesota's 
shortfall from the expected value ofFDI employment for the state is 3,542 persons. In other 
words, characteristics of the state other than those included in the equation are causing many 
fewer persons to be employed by foreign investors ( as defined by the Department of Commerce) 
than would have been expected. This amounts, however, to less than one percent of the state's 
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Table M1: Manufacturing FDI 
GSP96 MAN96SIZ GSPGR BORDER2 UNION ZONE CORPER HEXPER AVEPAY Ri Adjusted RL 
b 0.223 293.201 1.885 -11.221 0.152 1996 
t (14.450} (5.546} 1 (0.389} (-1.628} (0.277} 0.862 0.845 
Significance 0.000 0.000 0.700 0.111 0.783 
b 0.226 255.095 2.641 -13.627 -0.037 -2.401 1996 
2 . t (15.222} (4,772} (0.567} (-2.038} (-0.070} (-2.207) 0.876 0.858 
Significance 0.000 0.000 0.574 0.048 0.944 0.033 
·. b 
. 
0.221 302.936 0.985 -11.425 0.169 
-0.805 -212.005 1996 (11.529} (5.307} (0.169} (-1.563} (0.295} (-0.552} (-0.245} 0.863 0.839 3 t 
Significance 0.000 0.000 0.867 0.126 0.770 0.584 0.807 
b 0.211 293.078 -0.285 -13.193 0.001 1996 (11.236} (5.629} (-0.057} (-2.059} 0.866 0.850 4 t . .. (1.160) 
Significance 0.000 0.000 0.955 0.046 0.253 
Table M2: Manufacturing FDI by Value 
GSP96 MAN96SIZ GSPGR BORDER2 UNION ZON.E .. RL Adjusted R2 
b 0.028 32563.942 -952.022 -2341.888 -37.983 -276.504 ... 
1996 t (9.845) (3.196} (-1.073} (-1.837) (-0.374} (-1.333} 0.742 0.704 
Significance 0.000 0.003 0.290 0.073 0.710 0.190 
Table M3: Manufacturing FDI Over Time 
.. GSP MANSIZ f3ORPER1 RL Adjusted R~ 
b 0.220 295.321 -5.615 
19!16 t . (14.952) (5.545} (-0.838) 0.854 0.844 N=48 
. . Slgnlficanctt 0.000 0.000 0.406 
··• 
b ·• •··· 0.255 135.820 0.095 
1987 ,.' .. t .. · .• (15.184} (4.181} (0.019} 0.857 0.847 N=48 
. 
s,gnificance 0.000 0.000 0.985 
b 0.353 75.962 1.231 
1980 t (17.545} (4.062} (0.354} 0.891 0.883 N=48 
Significa11ce 0.000 0.000 0.725 
Figure M1: Manufacturing Investment 
Residuals from Equation M1 :1 
Residual(# of states) 
(values in 1000s) 
ti! 10.7 to 38.2 (13) 
D -3 to 10.7 (10) 
~ -9.6 to -3 (13) 
















Wholesale trade accounted for 9.8 percent ofFDI employment in 1996, about one 
percentage point lower than it had been in 1980. On theoretical grounds, we would expect the 
determinants of wholesaling to be quite different from those in manufacturing. Wholesaling, by 
its very nature, is not necessarily tied to the place of production; nor, of course, is it tightly 
bound geographically to the place of final sales. 
Initial Equivalent Equation (IEE) for Wholesale Trade 
R Adjusted R 
0.889 0.875 
The above equation confirms this result; the relative size of wholesaling employment 
does not appear to be a significant determinant of wholesaling FDI; there is also some indication 
that initial investor experience with east and west coast border states continued to play a role in 
wholesaling investment over time. Finally, there is a hint that unionization may be deterring FDI 
in wholesaling. 
As interesting as these results are, this equation (IEE) unfortunately provides unreliable 
information as it stands. When the dependent variable (in this case the total amount of foreign 
· investment in wholesaling), varies so much across the states (100 persons employed in Montana 
versus 93,200 in California), an estimation problem called heteroskedasticity typically arises.7 
Ordinary least squares regression, the technique employed to estimate the IEE, assumes that the 
errors across observations have the same variance. When the dependent variable varies widely in 
7 In fact, cross state regression of many measures typically provides the example of the heteroskedasticity problem 
in American textbooks. See, for example, Studenmund 1997, pp. 392-398. 
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size, however, larger observations are likely to be attended by larger errors. This means that the 
larger observations are absolutely less accurate and hence less useful in calculating the 
coefficients. Tests reveal that this situation obtains in all of the regressions in this study except 
manufacturing; hence, from this point forward, all results will be reported based on coefficient 
and standard error estimates after correction for heteroskedasticity. 8 
Table Wl, with correction for heteroskedasticity, shows considerable difference from the 
IEE-the table's first equation includes the same variables as the IEE. The significance of the 
negative impact of unionization has increased considerably, although the magnitude of the 
coefficient has decreased by over 50 percent. If one takes the result at face value, it implies that a 
one percentage point increase in the unionization of the labor force decreases wholesale FDI by 
105 workers. 
The significance of the border variable has also much increased while the magnitude of 
the coefficient dropped by half. Being one of the thirteen Border2 states implies an average 
increment of nearly 1,880 jobs in wholesaling, which is nearly 18 percent of the average value 
FDI wholesale employment for all of the states. 
The lack of performance by the ZONE variable stands in sharp contrast to the case with 
manufacturing. Adding the tax and expenditure variables reduces the significance of 
unionization, but does nothing otherwise. The result of average pay is consistent with that for 
unionization, but much weaker. 
The equations in Table Wl explain between three-quarters and four-fifths of the total 
variation in wholesale investment among the states. 






Table W2 shows the results for gross property plant and equipment investment using the 
same variables as shown in Table Wl: 1. The results are broadly similar except that the previous 
negative impact of unionization seems to melt away. The result may be due to some unknown 
combination of greater capital per worker where unionization is stronger and the greater extent of 
output misclassification in the value series. The border variable is also much less significant. 
Only about half of all variation is explained. 
Turning to the three historical comparisons in Table W3, the "old" border variable first 
fades and then comes back strongly in significance and to a much higher value. The ability of the 
equation to account for variation in the independent variable moves from just over half in 1980 
to nearly three-quarters in 1996 with all states in the equation throughout. 
Using the same approach as reported for the manufacturing sector, Minnesota once again 
has a shortfall: the magnitude, at 3,887, somewhat exceeds that estimated for manufacturing, but 
is a considerably higher proportion of the estimated size of the state wholesale sector: 2.6 
percent. See Figure Wl. 
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Table W1: Wholesale FOi 
GSP96 WS96SIZ GSPGR BORDER2 UNION ZONE CORPER HEXPER AVEPAY R:.t Adjusted R.t 
b 0.068 1.605 -0.369 1.793 -0.105 
1998 
1 t (11.452) (0.096) (-1.246) (4.392) (-2.116) 0.777 0.750 
Significance 0.000 0.924 0.220 0.000 0.040 
b 0.068 0.737 -0.350 1.869 -0.106 0.023 1998 (11.322) (0.042) (-1.115) (3.381) (-2.096) (0.206) 0.777 0.745 2 t 
Significance 0.000 0.966 0.271 0.002 0.042 0.838 
b 0.069 7.623 -0.194 1.765 -0.082 
-0.073 21.278 1996 (11.200) (0.379) (-0.494) 3 t (4.230) (-1.368) (-0.721) (0.512) 0.780 0.742 
Significance 0.000 0.707 0.624 0.000 0.179 0.475 0.612 
b 0.069 -3.368 -0.044 1.689 
-0.124 1996 (10.139) (-0.165) (-0.127) (3.930) 0.760 0.731 4 t (-1.057) 
Significance 0.000 0.870 0.899 0.000 0.296 
Table W2: Wholesale FOi by Value 
GSP98 WS96SIZ GSPGR BORDER2 UNION R' Adjusted R.t 
b 0.113 -1826.465 -83.863 184.005 -6.200 
1998 t (7.137) (-0.659) (-1.066) (1.712) (-0.467) 0.563 0.511 
Significance 0.000 0.514 0.293 0.094 0.643 
Table W3: Wholesale FOi Over Time 
GSP WSSIZ BORDER1 R2 Adjusted R.t 
b 0.065 6.482 1.377 
1998 t (10.992) (0.378) (3.537) 0.741 0.723 N=48 
Significance 0.000 0.707 0.001 
b 0.075 3.753 0.205 
1987 t (9.872) (0.324) (0.642) 0.689 0.668 N=48 
Significance 0.000 0.748 0.525 
b 0.083 -4.145 0.522 
1980 t (7.342) (-0.403) (1.648) 0.555 0.525 N=48 
Sfgnlflcance 0.000 0.689 0.107 
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Figure W1: Wholesale Trade 
Residuals from Equation W1 :1 
Residuals(# of states) 
(values in 1 0OOs) 
~ 1.6to27.5 (12) 
D -0.1 to 1.6 (12) 
~ -2.4 to -0.1 (12) 
IZI -s.2 to -2.4 < 12) 
Retail Trade 
Retail trade, which now accounts for about 16.5 percent of total FDI employment, 
presents a set of sectoral characteristics quite different from the previous two. Despite the 
phenomena of Internet and mail order shopping and the jurisdictional mismatch in some areas 
between the states where people shop and where they live, one would expect a very high 
correlation between total retail FDI employment and personal income. Personal income, 
however, correlates with GSP at .99, and one therefore scarcely anticipates a discemable 
independent role for retailing even if there were some reason to believe that foreign investors 
thrive in the overall environment of established retail ( as is apparently the case with 
manufacturing). It would also be surprising if unionization were important. Retail trade is not 
highly unionized in any state, and the local character of the market means that all firms must go 
where the customers are to participate at all. This characteristic also suggests the likelihood that 
the growth rate of demand could be important--or at least significant. 
Table RI provides some confirmation for these hunches. Although the relative size of 
retail employment in the state never attains a high level of significance, the growth rate of the 
state has a high and quite consistent magnitude at levels of significance between weak and fairly 
high. The coefficients on GSP growth over the period 1980-1996 suggest that each point added 
roughly 2,000-2,500 FDI retail employees, all else constant. The significance of the negative 
unionization variable is consistently quite low, while average pay is very weakly positive (the 
unexpected sign). The tax and expenditure variables do nothing, as is also the case with ZONE. 
The Border2 variable that captures the attraction of familiar territory is consistently very 









retail jobs of between 3,300 and over 4,800. Each of the equations explains about 70 percent of 
the variation in employment. 
The Gross Property, Plant, and Equipment results shown in Table R2 provide 
qualitatively similar results for all variables except the relative size of the retail sector, which in 
these data takes negative sign at a low level of significance. Both growth and the border effect 
are much less significant than in the case of employment. The percentage of variation in the data 
explained is a few points higher than for the employment equations. 
Table R3 shows the three time slice results. Those for 1987 closely resemble those for 
1996; the magnitude of the coefficients, their significance, and the total amount of variation 
explained are quite similar. Both GSP and Borderl contributed strongly to employment from the 
inflow of retail investment while the relative size of the sector appears irrelevant. The 1980 
results, however, differ greatly. Only thirty-eight states had useable data for that year-hence 
that regression is not really comparable to the others (this does not mean that the true reported 
number for the other states was zero, but the data were simply suppressed to avoid revealing the 
identity of specific firm activity). 
The Minnesota residual for retailing is again negative: 7,801. This is a bit over 1. 7 
percent of sectoral employment in the state. See Figure Rl. 
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Table R1: Retail FOi 
Adjusted R 
0.700 0.664 
0.000 0.282 0.093 0.025 0.329 
0.106 87.199 2.447 4.399 -0.210 -0.144 
(8.697) (1.110) (1.671) (1. 780) (-0.967) (-0.339) 0.701 0.657 
0.000 0.274 0.102 0.083 0.339 0.737 
0.104 74.448 2.068 4.768 -0.246 -0.170 -110.776 
(7.832) (0.885) (1.110) (2.240) (-1.057) (-0.388) (-0.472) 0.704 0.652 
0.000 0.382 0.274 0.031 0.297 0.700 0.639 
0.098 97.952 2.024 3.285 0.384 
(7.112) (1.234) (1.255) (1.601) (0.831) 0.698 0.662 
0.000 0.224 0.216 0.117 0.410 
Table R2: Retail FOi by Value 
l I I I I R2 I Adjusted R 0.742 0.711 
Table R3: Retail FDI Over Time 
I I i I .. . .. .. ...... . I R2 I Adjusted R 
0.681 I =l N=48 I 
0.000 0.588 0.007 
0.119 28.204 3.001 
(9.793) (0.502) (2.198) I 0.699 I 0.678 I N=48 
0.000 0.618 0.033 
0.107 -60.915 0.097 
(6.663) (-1.544) (0.076) I 0.607 I 0.572 I N=38 
0.000 0.132 0.940 
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Figure R 1: Retail Trade· 
Residuals from Equation R1 :1 
Residual (# of states) 
{values in 1000s) 
CJ 2.3 to 29.8 (11) 
0 -0.7 to 2.3 (13) 
~ -4 to -0.7 (12) 
~ -39.2 to -4 (12) 
Finance 
Finance is a very small direct investment sector, accounting for only about one percent of 
total employment in 1996. This figure does not include depository institutions, for which state 
level data are not available. It is difficult to know what a priori expectations to bring to a 
consideration of the sector. While it is technically footloose, acquisition must involve previous 
activity. Moreover, greenfield investors might well find better labor markets in areas where 
domestic finance is particularly well established. 
Table Fl shows several results that confirm the difficulty of pinning the sector down. The 
equations never succeed in capturing more than about a third of the variation in the data, and the 
only variable that shows a strong correlation with total financial sector investment is the gross 
economic size of the state. The relative size of the financial sector is consistently large in 
magnitude but lacks significance. 
Table F2, not surprisingly, shows that only GSP correlates strongly with the value figure 
as well. A slightly higher percentage of total variation is explained, and there is a suggestion of a 
positive influence of other financial activity in the state. 
Table F3 puts the problem into historical perspective. The 1987 results, which include all 
of the states, generally resemble those for 1996 except for a higher but still very meager 
significance level for relative financial size-at about the same level as a low magnitude Border 1 
shows for both 1996 and 1987-and a somewhat higher percentage of variation is explained. In 
1980 only half the states that had useable observations, and both the higher R2 and the appa!ently 
greater role for the relative size of state financial industry in that year, must therefore be 
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Table F1: Finance FDI 
t}::;.;·-:: }>: ~~: : .. :;:.::'·.. --::::·::: ,::: ,:':-::::·· ;:- . ~::, . ::: : ;:•.•-;::·,· ., .•• " , • , ,···--·}····•.::::.;·'::::··::··· 1-.,•.❖ c'' 
R"" Adjusted R 
0.339 0.260 
I I I I I 
0.000 0.418 0.365 0.470 0.640 
0.009 14.438 -0.255 0.363 0.017 0.022 
(4.171) (0.801) (a0,935) (0.696) (0.434) (0.249) I I I I 0.340 I 0.243 
0.000 0.428 0.355 0.490 0.667 0.805 
0.009 12.620 -0.190 0.301 0.022 -0.023 12.793 
(4.121) (0.766) (-0.585) (0.766) (0.542) (-0.282) (0.331) I I 0.341 I 0.226 
0.000 0.448 0.562 0.448 0.591 0.779 0.742 
0.009 11.836 -0.273 0.330 0.010 
(3.463) (0.755) (-0.967) (0.856) (0.121) I 0.335 I 0.256 
0.001 0.455 0.339 0.397 0.904 
Table F2: Finance FDI By Value 
I I I (:~!r''I R!:! I Adjusted R 0.366 I 0.288 
0.945 
Table F3: Finance FOi Over Time 
R"" I Adjusted R 
0.327 I =l N=48 I 
0.000 0.596 0.298 
0.024 34.192 0.522 
(5.486) (1.042) (1,066) I 0.414 I 0.374 I N=48 
0.000 0.303 0.292 
0.011 180.519 0.727 
(3.442) (2. 717) (2,354) I 0.545 I 0.480 I N=25 
0.002 0.013 0.028 
The growth of FDI in financial services in the United States has been retarded, as has 
insurance investment, by a history of state regulation. This has always_ led to greater expense and 
complexity of entry into a state, and, especially in early years, some states discriminated against 
foreign financial service investors. Financial services liberalization under WTO auspices is 
removing the last vestiges of protectionism (European Commission, 1998: 48-50). 
Minnesota's performance as a host to financial service investment is again indexed with a 







Figure F1: Finance 
Residuals from Equation F1 :1 
Residual (# of states) 
(values in 1000s) 
flJ 0.2 to 18.6 (10) 
0 -0.1 to 0.2 (14) 
0 -0.6 to -0.1 (12) 
~ -3.9 to -0.6 (12) 
Insurance 
Although its total foreign employment size is about three times that of finance, insurance 
presents many of the same problems for forming a priori expectations. One could not 
confidently predict the location of the main U.S. offices of firms entering from abroad, and the 
distribution of employment of those firms need not be closely tied to final sales in part because 
of the potential for use of independent sales agents. At least as much as in finance, however, one 
might expect some "huddling" in well-established insurance centers where targets of acquisition 
will also be concentrated. 
Table 11 suggests that in addition to the usual strongest showing for state size, the relative 
size of the insurance market in the state is an important determinant of location. The strongly 
significant coefficient suggests that for every one percent increase in the relative size of the 
insurance industry in the state, the level of employment by foreign insurance companies goes up 
by between 715 and 850. The negative coefficient on Border2 is both small and oflow 
significance. Especially in light of Connecticut's role as both a Border2 state and the state with 
the highest level of overall relative insurance employment in the country, this finding must stand 
as an anomaly (the simple correlation between the relative size of the insurance industry in a 
state and Border2 in 1996 is only .33; with Borderl, it is only .26). None of the other variables is 
significant by most standards with the exception of average pay, which just misses the 5 percent 
significance level, but the unexpected sign suggests spurious correlation. 
The fit of the insurance equations provides a sharp contrast with finance; between three-
quarters and 80 percent of the variation in the data is explained. 
Table 12 in value terms can be compared with those in Table 11. All variables except state 






The equations for comparison over time, Table 13, lose only one observation for 1987, 
but the observations drop to 39 for 1980. Although this means the comparison-and particularly 
the early one-must be considered tentative, it is interesting that the border coefficient declines 
in both size .and significance between 1980 and 1987 and then essentially disappears as an 
explanatory variable. The insurance industry appears to have dispersed strongly away from the 
states of original entry, although the reason is not apparent. 
Minnesota once again has a negative residual: 480, which is .84 percent of the state's 
sectoral work force. See Figure Il. 
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Table 11: Insurance FDI 
Adjusted R 
0.777 0.750 
0.000 0.021 0.831 0.607 0.831 
0.020 72.776 0.036 -0.392 0.011 -0.079 
(10.396) (1.960) (0.155) (-0.972) (0.295) (-1.095) 0.783 0.751 
0.000 0.057 0.878 0.337 0.770 0.280 
0.020 80.318 0.087 -0.168 0.012 0.044 12.145 
(9.924) (2.185) (0.307) (-0.459) (0.302) (0.609) (0.333) 0.780 0.741 
0.000 0.035 0.761 0.649 0.764 0.546 0.741 
0.018 71.507 -0.193 -0.354 0.144 
(8.354) (2.076) (-0.763) (-1.064) (1.983) 0.796 0.771 
0.000 0.044 0.450 0.294 0.054 
Table 12: Insurance FDI By Value 
I I - -1 I R2 I Adjusted R 0.663 0.623 
Table 13: ln_$urance FDI Over Time 
I I I ········1 R2 I Adjusted R 
0.775 I =-1 N=48 I 
0.000 0.021 0.795 
0.018 14.995 0.349 
(7.888) (0.742) (1.271) I 0.638 I 0.613 I N=48 
0.000 0.462 0.211 
0.023 17.608 1.254 
(5.536) (0.676) (3,231) I 0.602 I 0.568 I N=39 
0.000 0.503 0.003 





Figure 11: Insurance 
Residuals from Equation 11: 1 
Residual(# of states) 
(values in 1000s) 
Ill 0.4 to 11.2 (13) 
0 -0.1 to 0.4 (10) 
~ -0.6 to -0.1 (13) 
~ -4.6 to -0.6 (12) 
Real Estate 
The real estate category in the direct investment data refers to firms that actively 
participate in the real estate business. The data do not treat real estate acquisition that is 
incidental to a firm's main business, whether that is merely the real estate used directly in that 
business or acquired as a (perhaps partly speculative) investment. Foreign real estate 
employment is the smallest of any of the sectors studied: a mere 27,000 employees in 1996, only 
about one-half the size of total foreign financial sector employment. 
While many states have had restrictions on the foreign ownership of agricultural land 
over the entire post war period, much of that real estate is located in areas in which the foreign 
real estate firms would have suffered from a competitive market knowledge deficit anyway. On 
the other hand, urban real estate, which one assumes would be more likely to afford scope for the 
application of valuation techniques partly acquired abroad, have been generally open to foreign 
participation in all states. 
Table REI shows the results of regressions similar to those of previous sections with two 
previously unseen variables. The possibility that restrictions on either foreign ownership of 
agricultural land or on corporate ownership of land could negatively affect the interest of 
foreigners in building real estate businesses is examined. 
The variable "XEN" is used to indicate those states that had major restrictions on the 
foreign ownership of agricultural land in the early 1980s while those states that either had or 
were actively contemplating restrictions on corporate ownership of farmland during the same 
period are designated "CORP." These two variables provide exceptions to this study's use of 
values from much later in the period. The reasoning rests on what such legislation ( or pending 
legislation) indicates about the state's policy climate towards foreigners. The hunch is that, 
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whether the laws are in force or not, if restrictions are supported by a large part of the state 
legislature, there could be a deterrent effect. 
The regression results suggest that neither restrictions on agricultural land nor corporate 
fanning has an effect on foreign real estate operations. As in the case of insurance ( and possibly 
finance as well), there is a highly significant positive coefficient on the size of the real estate 
sector in the state, suggesting some mix of acquisition targets and well developed labor expertise. 
Given the frequent proximity of real estate firms to the assets they deal with, it might be thought 
that they would be drawn to the dynamic real estate markets that are often associated with rapid 
economic growth. In fact, however, the relative size of a state's real estate sector and state 
growth have a positive correlation of orily a modest .5. This datum takes the shock out of the 
negative but insignificant coefficient on growth found here, but both facts are somewhat 
puzzling. 
Border2 has a consistently moderate level of significance but very modest magnitude, 
even considering the sector's size. Of the remaining coefficients, average pay is significant, but 
its magnitude is negligible. The overall fit is quite modest at about two-thirds. 
The value regression presented in Table RE2 suggests a broadly similar result. GSP is a 
very significant determinant, but the relative size of the real estate industry is significant at only 
the 10 percent level. Border2 is a bit less significant still. The percentage variation explained is 
about 6 points higher than in the employment regression. 
The historical record shown in Table RE3 draws on a complete set of observations for 
1996 and 1987, but the number drops sharply to 29 for 1980. The story told is consistent, 
however. The relative size of the sector diminishes in both coefficient magnitude and 
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significance over time, but it stills shows quite strongly at the end of the period. The fit rises 
slightly from .60 to .64. 
The real estate residual for Minnesota is the only one yet found that is positive. Two 
hundred eleven more people are employed in foreign-owned real estate here than is predicted by 
the equation shown in Table REI: 1. See Figure REL r 
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Table RE1: Real Estate FDI 
GSP96 RE96SIZ GSPGR BORDER2 UNION ZONE CORPER HEXPER AVEPAY XEN CORP R" Adjusted R2 
13 0.004 51.374 -0.085 0.158 -0.015 1996 
t (7.318) (2.367) (-1.158) (1.630) (-1.406) 0.657 0.616 1 
Significance 0.000 0.023 0.253 0.111 0.167 
13 0.004 44.312 -0.067 0.181 -0.013 0.012 1996 t (7 .185) (1.746) (-0.821) (1.703) (-1.233) (0.549) 0.660 0.610 2 
Significance 0.000 0.088 0.416 0.096 0.225 0.586 
13 0.004 52.092 -0.072 0.164 -0.013 0.001 3.857 1996 (6.902) (2.204) (-0.803) (1.634) (-1.183) (0.067) (0.404) 0.659 0.599 ',3 · . . · t 
Significance 0.000 0.033 0.427 0.110 0.244 0.947 0.688 
13 0.004 47.221 0.002 0.161 
-0.039 1996 
t (7.403) (2.420) (0.026) (1.819) (-2.024) 0.673 0.634 4 
Significance 0.000 0.020 0.979 0.076 0.049 
13 0.004 37.188 -0.035 0.131 0.074 1996 
t (7.043) (1.887) (-0.482) (1.271) (0.747) 0.646 0.603 5 
Significance 0.000 0.066 0.632 0.211 0.459 
13 0.004 36.208 -0.053 0.075 
-0.038 1996 (7.068) (1.810) (-0.754) (0.865) (-0.47) 0.643 0.600 •· 6 .. t ··• .. · ..
I.· Significance 0.000 0.078 0.455 0.392 0.641 
Table RE2: Real Estate FDI By Value 
GSP98 RE96SIZ GSPGR BORDER2 UNION R' Adjusted R' 
13 0.014 109815.513 -219.989 445.200 -40.612 
1996 t (9,062) (1.680) (-0.996) (1.524) (-1.298) 0.720 0.686 .. 
Significance 0.000 0.100 0.325 0.135 0.201 
Table RE3: Real Estate FDI Over Time 
GSP RESIZ BORDER1 Rz Adjusted Ff 
.. 13.• .. ·•·· 0.004 31.045 0.078 
1!196 . J> ... 
.. •. . ..... (7.231) (1.846) (0.899) 0.637 0.612 N=48 
Significance· 0.000 0.072 0.374 
13 0.007 37.420 -0.071 
1987 t (6.986) (2.185) (-0.659) 0.627 0.602 N=48 
Significance 0.000 0.034 0.513 
13 0.007 53.259 -0.062 
1980 .... t ..... (3.712) (3.246) (-0.34) 0.596 0.548 N=29 
· s19nii1¢ance 0.001 0.003 0.737 
Source for XEN and CORP: David N. Laband, Foreign Ownership of U.S. Farmland, Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1984, pp.113. 
Figure RE 1: Real Estate 
Residuals from Equation RE1 :1 
Residual(# of states) 
(values in 1000s) 
D 0.1 to 2.a (13) 
[) O to 0.1 (9) 
~ -0.2 to o (13) 
















Services is a heterogeneous category in the BEA data, but it actually results from an 
attempt to provide more useful information. Prior to 1987, state level activities in this category 
were included in the "Other Industries" category, to be examined in the following section. And 
the data adjustment is important, because the sector includes a substantial part of total 
employment from direct investment: 12.7 percent in 1996. 
The discrete categories included in the national tabulations (but not the state data) 
include: hotels; business services; motion pictures; engineering, architectural, and surveying 
services; accounting, research, management, and related services; health services; and "other" 
services. One is hard pressed to come up with a priori predictions in such a mixed group. For 
example, it would be surprising if the relativ~ size of such a heterogeneous sector correlated 
strongly with direct investment activity. 
Table SI presents some surprises. Relative service sector size performs well in every 
equation except the one with average pay, which suggests that, however heterogeneous the 
services included, some proxying for acquisition targets is being captured and perhaps that same 
state level forces that are drawing domestic activity are drawing foreigners as well. Border2 
comes through less strongly than for many other sectors. On the other hand, both of the labor 
cost variables, union strength and average pay, make some showing. While the average pay 
coefficient is of negligible size, the union variable is both larger and more significant than in any 
other-sector. It implies that every point of lower unionization is associated with 255 to 291 more 
FDI service jobs. Overall, one might venture that "Services" as a whole are less determined by 
historical familiarity and more by a low cost and flexible labor force than any other sector. 
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Moreover, the variables we look at produce among the highest levels of association with total 
variation in employment due to foreign investment: over 90 percent. 
Table S2 shows little of interest; the coefficients are of the same sign as in the 
employment equations, but only state economic size is significant. In particular, the strong 
negative showing by the union variable in the employment equations signifies here only at the 25 _ 
percent level. A considerably lower level of variation is explained than in the previous case: only 
about three-quarters of the total. 
This category has a shorter history than the others do; hence Table S3 shows only 1996 
and 1987, the first year for which the state service breakout is available. 9 In this simple 
specification, service sector size does not come through as an important determinant in 1996, as 
it does in Table S 1; on the other hand, relative size is clearly important in 1987. The historic 
border measure does nothing in either period. 
The Minnesota residual for the service category is -3,135. About three thousand fewer 
persons worked for foreign service firms in the state in 1996 than would have been the case if the 
state had been at the mean level of FDI employment after taking into account the variables 
shown in Table S 1: 1. See Figure S 1. 
9 In 1987, the service category in national investment was only 4.2 percent of employment; by 1987, it had grown to 
9.0 percent. This suggests that, while the 1980 data for all other categories considered in our previous historical 


























Table S2: Service FDI By Value 
Table S3: Service FDI Over Time 
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Figure S1: Services 
Residuals from Equation S1 :1 
Residual(# of states) 
(values in 1 00Os) 
■ 1 to24 (13) 
D 0.1 to 1 (10) 
~ -2.3 to 0.1 (13) 



















The "Other Industries" category in BEA data is indeed a grab-bag "not elsewhere 
classified," but it covers some very important activities. Specifically, it includes agriculture, 
forestry, and fishing; mining; construction; transportation; and communication and public 
utilities. Together they accounted for about 9.6 percent ofFDI employment in 1996. 
Despite the heterogeneity of the sector; one characteristic attaches to many of its 
components: government regulation. Although only foreign agricultural land ownership is 
regulated at the state level, and foreign-owned firms are presumably free everywhere to actually 
control production on such land, state restrictions undoubtedly affect some agricultural activity. 
Federal law is far more important. While telecommunications has been recently liberalized, both 
that sector and broadcasting have historically had a 20 percent foreign ownership cap (the FCC 
could grant exceptions, but they were rare). Similarly, in domestic air transport, there has been a 
25 percent cap, subject to discretionary waiver by the Secretary of Transportation who has used 
it to bargain with specific foreign governments for concessions to U.S. airlines. In some natural 
resource exploitation, the federal government either blocks foreign activity ( e.g. uranium 
mining), grants access on a reciprocal basis ( e.g. gas pipelines), or requires ownership in certain 
legal forms ( e.g. some hydroelectric power generation). 
Given the large number of restricted foreign ownership activities in the "Other 
Industries" sector, one is particularly likely to get odd results from the Department of Commerce 
rule making 10 percent ownership sufficient for all of a firm's activities to count as "foreign 
investment." BEA data for the 1970s suggested that over three-quarters of the equity of an 
average affiliate was held by foreigners and that changing the rule from 10 to 20 or even 50 
percent would not change the overall FDI picture very much (Graham and Krugman, 1995: 10-
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11). Nonetheless, the rule necessarily distorts most in sectors in which a 10 percent or greater 
stake cannot mean complete ownership. For example, all transportation and broadcasting 
activities in which the maximum minority stake is in fact taken will be carried by the BEA as 
totally foreign investments and in that way will misreport the control situation in every case. 
No confidently held a priori assumptions can be suggested about this sector. Given its 
heterogeneity, no attempt was made to discover what part of the state's economy the activities 
represent. Moreover, the importing or import-substitution activity that typically provides some 
punch for the Border2 variable might not importantly affect investment ofthis kind. Finally, 
several of the sectors involved are so heavily unionized that state level unionization could not be 
expected to affect the overall results. The explanatory quandary is consistent with the results 
shown in Table O 1. As has been the case so far only with the Finance sector, which is about one 
tenth "Other Industries" size, only the GSP variable is significant in any of the specifications. 
Unsurprisingly, fewer than 70 percent of total variation is explained in all of the equations. 
Table 02 presents results that are more sharply at variance with the employment 
equations that for any of the well.,defined sectors. The great disparity between the employment 
and value figures may result partly from the high capital intensity of several of the subsectors. 
For "Other Industries," the Gross Property Plant and Equipment value is about $200,000 per 
worker compared to $160,000 per worker for all U.S. foreign direct investment. The equation 
explains 42 percent of total variation in the dependent variable. 
The Union variable takes the unexpected sign with a very high level of significance, and 
this is indeed an anomaly. It is one thing to argue, as was just done, that the general unionization 








that it should be strongly and positively associated with it. The level of unionization in natural 
resource extraction may be part of the explanation. 
Looking historically with Table 03, 1987 looks very much like 1996 with none of the 
variables except GSP showing significance. Moving from 1987 to 1980 takes the sample from 
forty-four· states down to thirty-one, so the later result in particular should be used with caution. 
Nonetheless, it does indicate a positive and significant early role for familiar territory-not 
something that might be thought as likely as in many other sectors. 
The Minnesota story for "Other Industries" is more interesting than that for any of the 
other sectors and provides an important reminder about the characteristics of the data. The 
positive residual for Minnesota is 15,219 employees, a very impressive positive showing for the 
state and one of only two positive residuals. See Figure O 1. 
This study has had little to say about home countries because that factor cannot be 
considered simultaneously with our concerns. If the data were sorted out by sector, state, and 
home country, many states would have at best one firm from any one country per sector. So even 
if the BEA made such data available, it would be of limited use because the BEA cannot report 
in a way that reveals firms' identities. Nonetheless, looking at the home country data is very 
instructive for interpreting the "Other Industries" category for Minnesota. The BEA reports that 
there were a total of 22,500 employees Minnesota working for Dutch firms in 1996. Because 
there are apparently no large Dutch investments in Minnesota outside of the airline industry, one 
has to assume that virtually all of this number reflects the operations of Northwest Airlines. This, 
of course, resulted from KLM's 19.6 percent ownership share in Northwest. So the major direct 
investment in Minnesota's Other Industries category was a minority stake in a firm that was here 
all of the time! 
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In addition, there appears to have been somewhat more than 2,000 mining jobs in the 
Arrowhead Region in 1996 accounted for by firms that had at least a 10 percent foreign share 
(Minnesota Department of Revenue, 1997). The airline and mining employment together appear 
to leave no more than about 500 jobs in the Minnesota's "Other Industries" FDI investment. 
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Table 01: Other·FDI 
, .. ,.(.. ... , ....... 
, ... :. ... _. .. ,· 
R'" Adjusted R 
0.687 0.657 I I I I I 0.000 0.326 0.484 0.279 
0.062 0.949 -0.076 0.141 0.271 
(8.729) (1.111) (-0.051) (1.066) (1.057) I I I I 0.693 I 0.650 
0.000 0.273 0.960 0.293 0.297 
0.061 0.907 -0.862 0.147 -0.165 -1.177 
(8.158) (0.877) (-0.659) (1.035) (-0.625) (-0.009) I I 0.694 I 0.641 
0.000 0.385 0.513 0.307 0.536 0.993 
0.063 0.677 -0.367 0.000 
(7.437) (0.685) (-0.292) (0.145) I 0.682 I 0.644 
0.000 0.497 0.772 0.885 
Table 02: Other FDI By Value 
I I I I R~ I Adjusted R 0.423 0.369 
Table 03: Other FDI Over Time 
Adjusted R 
0.672 I ::-i N=48 I 
0.000 0.731 
0.039 -0.571 
(9.689) (-1.326) I 0.706 I 0.684 I N=44 
0.000 0.192 
0.068 0.718 
(11.834) (2.343) I 0.860 I 0.844 I N=31 
0.000 0.026 
Figure 01: Other Industries 
Residuals from Equation 01 :1 
Residual(# of states) 
(values in 1000s) 
lll 1.9to15.5 (12) 
D -0.3 to 1.9 (12) 
~ -2.5 to -0.3 (12) 










The preceding analysis demonstrates enough diversity among apparent causal variables 
and fit to cast doubt on the wisdom of routinely discussing all ofFDI together. Nonetheless, 
many descriptions of FDI rank states by their overall draw of investment or the employment 
attached to it, and a brief look at aggregate data may be useful. 
Table Tl shows the same set of regressions as have been reported by sector, once again, 
as with the Other Industries sector, dispensing with a relative size variable. As in the case of all 
previous results, GSP is by far the most significant single determinant of total FDI, implying that 
every million dollars of additional state product is associated with between 652 and 664 
additional FDijobs. There is rather little else to report. Only the ZONE variable makes a 
significant showing, reflecting its importance in manufacturing and the nearly 45 percent share 
of that sector in total FDI employment. The union variable is negative but only at a modest level 
of significance. The Border2 variable is positive with about the same level of significance in the 
three equations not including ZONE. GSP growth has a consistently very large coefficient but a 
level of significance lower than for the negative effect of unionization. Over 90 percent of total 
variation is explained. 
Table T2 shows that value is strongly and significantly linked to total state size; the other 
variables have negligible significance except for the growth which has an unexpected sign but is 
"significant" at only the 20 percent level. The total variation explained is about five and one half 
points lower than in the comparable employment equation. 
The historical picture from Table T2 provides little insight into the development of total 
FDI. The coefficient on the "old" border variable increases in magnitude over time, but that 
growth in importance must be treated with skepticism because the coefficient is significant by 
65 
most standards in 1980. The total proportion of variation explained rose from 87 percent in 1990 
to 92 percent in 1996. 
The Minnesota residual for total investment is 5,216, but qualifications for this apparently 
strong showing have already been noted. The Northwest-KLM venture was fraught with conflict 
nearly from its inception in 1989 (Tully, 1996, 64ft), and KLM divested its Northwest stock in 
two steps: September of 1997 and May of 1998 (Steenland, 1999). Hence, the Minnesota 
residual in "Other Industries" for the period since has presumably been strongly negative, and 
this implies a substantial negative residual for total investment as well. See Figure Tl. 
Some other states' positions in the overall FDI pecking order may be just as tenuously 
dependent on one firm's behavior as Minnesota's was, but there is an additional point: No one 
could seriously claim that the KLM investment tranche had much, if anything, directly to do with 
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Table T1: Total FDI 
_.,., .. , .... ,.,., , .... ;,.;. .... , .. ,, .... 
. ___ .·. ··'"'· .... I, ........... ., .. , R.: Adjusted R 
0.923 0.916 I I I I I 0.000 0.278 0.164 0.207 
0.659 3.201 1.232 -0.697 -2.164 
(22.218) (0.895) (0.198) (-1.263) (-2.017) I I I I 0.930 I 0.922 
0.000 0.376 0.844 0.214 0.050 
0.659 2.742 7.372 -0.835 0.356 -292.547 
(20.210) (0.612) (1.302) (-1.354) (0.311) (-0.5) I I 0.924 I 0.913 
0.000 0.544 0.200 0.183 0.758 0.620 
0.652 4.414 4.661 0.000 
(17.818) (1.027) (0.853) (0.051) I 0.920 I 0.913 
0.000 0.310 0.398 0.960 
Table T2: Total FDI By Value 
I I I I R2 I Adjusted R 0.869 0.857 
Table T3: Total FDI Over Time 
I I I . .. I R2 I Adjusted R 
0.919 I =l N=48 I 
0.000 0.127 
0.700 4.166 
(17.939) (0.954) I 0.877 I 0.872 I N=48 
0.000 0.345 
771.613 6699.425 
(17.209) (2.399) I 0.868 I 0.862 I N=48 
0.000 0.021 
Figure T1 : Total Investment 
Residuals from Equation T1: 1 
Residual(# of states) 
(values in 1000s) 
R sto87 (13) 
0 -1 to 5 (10) 
~ -8 to -1 (12) 









MINNESOTA'S RESIDUALS ACROSS SECTORS 
To clarify the importance of the Other Industries category in Minnesota's 1996 
performance, the last row in Table 6, which summarizes all of the state residuals, also shows the 
residual with the KLM (Northwest) estimated employment removed. The residual becomes 
-16,784, although that was only about .64 of one percent of the total 1996 work force. 












TOTAL INVESTMENT BY HOME ·COUNTRY OR REGION 
Tables Hl-H3 show regressions attempting to find differences in the explanatory power of the 
key variables used in this study by the source of investment: Canada, Europe and Japan. Given 
the somewhat disappointing results for the regressions for total investment without regard to 
source, the results do not surprise. GSP variation dominates the other variables in all three 
equations, and it is the only significant variable for Europe and Japan, although in the European 
regression there is a suggestion of union avoidance. France accounts for at least some of that 
tendency. Canadian investment is positively affected by state growth rates and by Border2 at 
above 10 percent significance levels. 
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Table H1 :Canadian FDI 
Table H2:European FDI 
Table H2A:German FDI 
,Table H2B: French FDI 
Table H2C:British FDI 
Table H3:Japanese FDI 
0.000 0.934 0.900 0.860 
' ,,,,.-·-, ,,,----~ ,...---"' ✓----l /-., /---\ (- --, ,-·, ,,,..-- ' / -, r· --'. r- -." / -, r '1 t " ,,,-~ .,..--1 
R~ I Adjusted R 
0.812 I 0.795 
R~ I Adjusted R 
0.858 I 0.844 
R~ I Adjusted R 
0.760 I 0.738 
Adjusted R 
0.750 
R Adjusted R' 
0.811 0.793 
R~ I Adjusted R' 
0.743 I 0.719 
,---: '/ ' /- '1 ,- ' ,--1 l ......--,, ,,..---~ ,,....-, ,,---, -✓---..... r ·-, (,-----, 
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CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
It has long been known that the efforts begun with such fanfare under the Perpich 
administration to attract foreign investment to Minnesota have met with only modest success. 
But what difference does it make? The original justification for encouraging FDI was the same 
as for promoting exports and for most "economic development" schemes more broadly: to create· _ 
jobs in the 1980s. From the perspective oflate 1999, that objective might seem odd given the 
state's nation-leading employment rates and complaints from leaders all over the state about 
labor shortages. While many would caution that such high levels of activity have not persisted 
for a long time in the past and are unlikely to do so in the future, only FDI particularly linked to 
foreign markets and not highly correlated with U.S. domestic demand would be effectively 
countercyclical. 
An assessment of the importance of direct investment for Minnesota and its significance 
for public policy suggests a few key points. First, the data used in this study include both 
acquisitions and gr~enfield investments, with the latter only about 5 to 10 percent of the total. 
Thus, a drive to bring most available FDI to Minnesota would involve a lot of what would 
amount to brokerage. Can state policy really do much to improve foreign intelligence about 
Minnesota firms that might be ripe targets for takeover? And, even if it made economic sense, 
would such a strategy be politically salable? A negative answer to that question probably 
underlies a secularly increasing emphasis within the Minnesota Trade Office towards export 
assistance and away from attempts to lure more FDI. The precise time pattern of resource 
allocation has not been recorded, but information for 1986 suggested that resources devoted to 
export promotion exceeded that for FDI encouragement by only about 60 percent (Kudrle and 
Kite, 1988: 6). By the early 1990s resources earmarked exclusively for FDI had virtually 
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disappeared. The prima facie case that this was a wise reordering of priorities appears very 
strong, although little is known about the efficacy of the export-oriented activity. 
Some would claim that FDI contributes to employment only when greenfield investment 
takes place, but that is an oversimplification. Foreigners can typically make the best acquisition 
bid for a firm when they have superior production or marketing strength. One can imagine a 
situation in which a takeover cuts employment by improving productivity without improving 
market penetration. But this will not be the typical case. Stronger firms usually improve their 
market position, and that will typically lead to increases in employment, although that 
employment increase may not all take place in the state where the main activity is located. And 
greenfield investments can reduce employment in competing firms, although that won't happen 
if the new firm is the only state firm in that industry. 
Greenfield investments have other characteristics that make their employment impact 
uncertain. Even in periods of high unemployment, most new operations do not draw heavily on 
unemployed workers. Instead, they find workers in a wide array of local, state, regional, and 
national labor markets, often yielding a very modest impact on local unemployment. In other 
words, it would be coincidental if the new activity fit well with the pattern oflocal 
unemployment. And business expansion in times of high employment can create labor market 
difficulties for other firms that might cause them to relocate. Hence, the impact of greenfield 
investment, not only on local employment but also on the tax base, may often not be more 
confidently predicted than the impact of an acquisition. 
In general, of course, there is a presumption of increased economic activity from both 
kinds of direct investment. This, in turn, is expected to have an uncertain but positive impact on 











much revenue has been foregone to lure the activity in the first place). Most of this argument 
applies equally to other types of business development, however. In the case of direct 
investment, the uncertain net effect has to be considered in light of modest size of the initial 
gross impact. Moreover, this _study has established that overall state size and the existing 
structure of the state's economy are overwhelmingly strong factors in determining a state's FDI. . 
The second factor is certainly driven by some combination of takeover targets for acquirers and 
appropriate personnel for both acquirers and greenfield investors. 
The broad picture ofFDI determinants presented in this study suggests that Minnesota's 
best approach to FDI policy is indirect. It should establish a favorable climate for the attraction, 
retention, and growth of economic activities that it regards as desirable. FDI is likely to play 
some positive role in that larger picture, largely of its own accord. 
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